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The last decade has witnessed the rise of populist parties and a number of actors that
question liberal democracy. Many explanations of this rely on dissatisfied citizens. We
ask in this paper whether and how institutions allowing citizens to participate in policy-
making affect differences in democratic satisfaction within varying representative contexts
as well as between electoral winners and losers. To do so, we first develop a measure
of sub-national direct democracy and then use it together with extensive survey data to
investigate how direct democracy is associated with citizens’ evaluation of their democratic
system. We conclude that direct democracy is not generally related to more satisfied
people but rather closes the ‘satisfaction-gap’ between electoral winners and losers. In
contrast to previous research, we demonstrate that this mechanism holds across different
representative systems.
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1 Introduction
Recent decades have seen an intensified interest in democratic satisfaction. Liberal democracy
seemed to be the inevitable outcome of historic processes and modernization (Lipset, 1959;
Fukuyama, 1989). But the last decade and the crystallization of political forces opposed to
liberal democracy highlight that liberal democracy is the only possible outcome. This fuels
research on how citizens evaluate the political system in which they live and how satisfied they
are with it (e.g. Norris, 2011; Liberini, Redoano, and Proto, 2017; Esaiasson, Dahlberg, and
Kokkonen, 2020). The main challenge emerges from populist parties, which have been consid-
ered to be “an expression of dissatisfaction with existing modes of organized elite-mass political
intermediation and the desire to abandon the intermediaries that stand between citizens and
rulers” (Kitschelt, 2002, p. 179). In this paper, we focus on institutions allowing for more
citizen involvement and whether they go along with higher levels of individual satisfaction
with democracy.
Direct democratic institutions receive special attention since they appear to bridge the gap
between (perhaps) naive ideals of individual engagement with the res publica and a represen-
tative system. This is not a new phenomenon and can actually be traced back to the early
days of representative democracy. After the French revolution, the assémble nationale had
to draft a constitution. One faction, the Girondist to whom Condorcet belonged, proposed
a draft that entailed a number of direct democratic elements but it was ultimately rejected
(Kölz, 2004). Ever since, direct democracy has been proposed as a remedy to felt deficiencies
of representative democracies. Whether direct democracy empirically succeeds in overcoming
these perceived deficiencies and whether it has negative externalities are other questions.
This is reflected in both public discourse1 and in academic research (Freitag and Stadelmann-
Steffen, 2010; Frey and Stutzer, 2000; Frey, 1994; Frey and Stutzer, 2010; Gerber, 1999; Hei-
dbreder et al., 2019; Leemann and Wasserfallen, 2016; Matsusaka, 2005, 2010; Stadelmann-
Steffen and Vatter, 2012; Stutzer and Frey, 2003; Frey and Stutzer, 2010; Smith and Tolbert,
1Politics without Politicians by Nathan Heller in The New Yorker (19.2.2020, https:
//www.newyorker.com/news/the-future-of-democracy/politics-without-politicians, Politics
without Politicians by Torbiörn Kjell in Svenska Dagsblatt (25.2.2017, https://www.svd.se/
schweiz-modell-bor-ses-som-ett-foredome/om/debatt), or Alle Macht dem Parlament - und den
Bürgern! by Heribert Prantl in Süddeutsche Zeitung (28.1.2018, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/
prantls-blick-alle-macht-dem-parlament-und-den-buergern-1.3844015).
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2004; Webb, Scarrow, and Poguntke, 2019). Hug (2009) explicitely called for a study on how
direct democratic institutions interact with elements of the representative system. At times
when democracy is not the only game in town anymore, it is even more relevant to know more
about whether direct democratic institutions affect (dis)satisfaction with the representative
political system and how this depends on the structure of the representative system.
This is the starting point of this paper, in which we delve deeper into the association
between direct democracy and individual satisfaction using a comparative perspective across
countries and sub-national units. We ask: Is direct democracy related to higher levels of
democratic satisfaction and how does it interact with representative democracy? Regarding
the latter, we particularly focus on how electoral winners and losers in different representative
contexts react to direct democratic institutions. These representative contexts not only vary
with respect to formal electoral procedures, i.e., majoritarian vs. proportional elections, but
also more broadly with the way in which they deal with and integrate (political) minorities
(Lijphart, 1999; Bernauer and Vatter, 2012)
We are not the first ones to study the role of direct democracy for democratic satisfaction.
Most prominently, the studies by Frey and Stutzer (Frey and Stutzer, 2010, 2000; Stutzer and
Frey, 2003) and their “happiness hypothesis” have triggered a series of research analyzing the
relationship between direct democratic institutions and citizens’ satisfaction with democracy.
This literature provides mixed empirical results (Altman, 2002; Dorn et al., 2007; Bernauer
and Vatter, 2012; Radcliff and Shufeldt, 2016; Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter, 2012). In the
present study, we go beyond previous research in at least three respects.
First, based on a short review of the existing literature, we develop novel arguments re-
garding the interaction between electoral and direct democracy, namely concerning the gap
in democratic satisfaction between electoral winners and losers. While previous authors have
either focused their argumentation on consensual forms of direct democracy (Bernauer and
Vatter, 2012) or on the role of direct democracy in majoritarian electoral systems (Radcliff
and Shufeldt, 2016), we argue and show empirically that direct democracy narrows the winner-
loser gap quite independently from the characteristics of the electoral system.
Second, we propose a sub-national comparative research design including all the sub-
national units from the US, Switzerland, Germany, and Austria. This enables us to study
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and compare both majoritarian and consensual sub-national democracies, which moreover ex-
hibit varying degrees of direct democracy. In fact, one of the main shortcomings of previous
research has been that it was often entirely sub-national research on countries in which direct
democracy is extensively developed (e.g., Swiss cantons or the US states) but these countries
all follow either a consensual or a majoritarian system. In contrast, while studies at the coun-
try level were able to compare these different representative models of democracy, they face
the problem that there is very little variation in direct democracy among the studied coun-
tries (Bernauer and Vatter, 2012). Thus, based on these previous approaches, we lack a truly
comparative view, which has consequences for the scope and opportunity to understand and
learn about direct democratic institutions.2 Our sub-national cross-country approach enables
us to take Hug’s claim seriously, namely that we should try to understand better how direct
democratic institutions interact with other elements of representative democracy (Hug, 2009).
Finally, as the third departure from the existing literature, we build on work by Altman
(2017) to propose and provide a measure of direct democratic institutions for 101 sub-national
units across four countries. We refer to direct democracy as a set of institutions that allow
citizens to challenge a government’s decision. It is an institutionalized process by which ei-
ther citizens collect (sufficient) signatures and force a ballot vote thereby or the constitution
demands a mandatory ballot vote. This ballot decision can take the form of an initiative
(when citizens propose a new law) or of an optional or mandatory referendum. This bundle
of institutions distinguishes, e.g., from instances where the government “allows” people to vote
on an issue (Altman, 2017). Depending on how easy the access to these direct democratic
instruments is and how frequently they are used, we conceptualize direct democracy not only
as a binary feature (i.e., is available or not) but as a matter of degree. The four countries
under investigation, i.e., the US, Switzerland, Germany, and Austria, are the four cases that
we identified where direct democracy not only exists at the sub-national level but also varies
between within the country in a relevant way.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first present previous research on
the relationship between direct democracy and individual satisfaction as well as literature on
representative systems and satisfaction. Based on this, we formulate a number of empirical
2See Geissel, Krämling, and Paulus (2019) for a rare example applied to the heterogeneous effects of direct
democracy on inequality.
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expectations. We then present the measurement approach, building on the country-level index
by Altman (2017), and show how it compares to existing measures. In the fourth section, we
provide empirical results by analysing the association between direct democracy and satisfac-
tion with democracy in 101 sub-national units and across four countries. In particular, and
in line with the theoretical argument, we show that the gap in satisfaction with democracy
between electoral winners and electoral losers disappears when direct democratic institutions
are extensively available.
2 Theoretical Background
Before presenting our argument, we first discuss two strands of literature, namely research on
how elements of the representative system (e.g., majoritarian vs. consensus) affect citizens’
satisfaction and research on how direct democratic institutions can affect satisfaction with
democracy. Second, we bring these two discussions together and formulate our argument. The
core claim we make builds on the work by Anderson and Guillory (1997) that the representative
system leads to a satisfaction gap between electoral winners and losers. We argue that this gap
can be narrowed through direct democratic institutions; extensive forms of direct democratic
institutions are capable of refilling this satisfaction gap such that the differences between
winners and losers become smaller.
2.1 Representative Democracy and Democratic Satisfaction
How does the nature of the representative system affect citizens’ satisfaction with the demo-
cratic system? Anderson and Guillory (1997) show that consensus and majoritarian democ-
racies treat winners (those who have voted for a political party entering the government) and
losers (who have voted for a party that is not part of the government) in the electoral process
differently, which influences citizens’ satisfaction. They find that in majoritarian democra-
cies, the gap in democratic satisfaction between winners and losers in the electoral systems is
larger compared with consensual democracies (see also Anderson et al., 2005; Anderson and
Guillory, 1997; Bernauer and Vatter, 2012; Martini and Quaranta, 2019; Singh, Karakoç, and
Blais, 2012). In a nutshell, in majoritarian systems, the winners tend to be more satisfied,
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while the losers are less satisfied.
Anderson and Guillory (1997) argue that this is due to the institutional settings, i.e., the
nature of representative democracy. In particular, institutional settings that provide “electoral
losers with significant rights to participate in governmental decision making” (Anderson and
Guillory, 1997, p. 68) reduce the gap between winners and losers. In this argument, the focus is
on typical elements of consensual democracies such as two chambers, multiparty governments,
federalism, and decentralization following Lijphart (1999), but Anderson and Guillory also
name referendums.
2.2 Direct Democracy and Democratic Satisfaction
In a series of influential empirical studies, Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2010) have documented
an association between direct democracy (in the Swiss cantons) and people’s life satisfaction.
The authors found that people reported significantly higher levels of satisfaction if they lived
in a Swiss canton with easier access to and more frequent use of direct democratic institutions.
Similar findings have been presented for the US context (Radcliff and Shufeldt, 2016). But
some of these findings have also been questioned, especially in the case of Switzerland (Dorn
et al., 2007; Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter, 2012).
Theoretically, the argument that direct democracy affects individual satisfaction seems to
be quite compelling, in particular if applied to democratic satisfaction, on which we concentrate
in the following. First, policy outcomes in a direct democratic setting can be expected to be
closer to the median voter’s preferences, therefore resulting in more satisfied citizens. Second,
direct democracy should produce positive procedural effects, i.e., provide the perception of
procedural fairness.
Several studies corroborate these underlying mechanisms, especially with respect to the
outcome of direct democracy. Gerber (1996) shows that laws passed by the legislature are
closer to the median voter in the states that allow for initiatives. Similarly, Matsusaka (2004)
claimed that “Direct Democracy Works” with respect to outcomes, voter competence, and the
principal-agent problem. For the Swiss context, Leemann and Wasserfallen (2016) documented
that direct democratic institutions are conducive for policy congruence, even when no vote
takes place. The constant threat of a referendum constrains legislators to a certain extent.
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Finally, Olken (2010) showed how participation in decision-making affects satisfaction.
However, previous research also offers arguments and findings that question a general
positive relationship between direct democracy and democratic satisfaction. One concern
emphasizes that the mechanisms and, thus, potentially the outcomes of direct democracy
are contingent on how these participatory instruments are embedded in the political system
(Heidbreder et al., 2019). A consequence of this is that these effects may not materialize under
any circumstances. In particular, we need to consider that direct democratic institutions
interact with other elements of representative democracy (Hug, 2009). Most importantly,
direct democracy may differently affect satisfaction in majoritarian and consensual political
systems.
This can be illustrated by contrasting the sub-national entities of the US and Switzerland.
Switzerland is a typical example of a consensus democracy (Linder, 2010; Lijphart, 1999) of
which direct democracy is a crucial and integral element. Direct democracy has forced and
still forces political actors to share power; it has played a pivotal role in the emergence of
a multiparty government and a consensual political culture. Although the US states along
with Switzerland can be considered as “the pioneers of modern direct democracy” (Gross and
Kaufmann, 2003, p. 3), the role of direct democracy in the US is quite different. Direct demo-
cratic rights in the US have not led to power sharing, but direct democracy offers a way to
“get around” the legislature (Heidbreder et al., 2019, p. 375). By building a parallel, indepen-
dent way of policy-making, direct democracy may exacerbate problems of representation that
are inherent to majoritarian democracies and, as a consequence, negatively affect satisfaction
with democracy (Aarts and Thomasson, 2008).3 Unlike in Switzerland, direct democracy in
the US infrequently involves a broader input and discussion on a salient problem but rather
produces outputs that are even more conflicting than those originating from the traditional
policy-making arena (Möckli, 1994, p. 111, 352).4 From this perspective, the question must
3Of course, the popular initiative in Switzerland can also be considered an instrument to “get around” the
legislature by proposing new laws or articles that the parliament has failed to introduce. However, in research
on Swiss direct democracy it is broadly accepted that the popular initiative clearly goes beyond the “getting
around the legislature” and at least has three more functions, namely 1) to enforce consensual behavior by the
legislature and the government, 2) to bring new issues on the political agenda, and 3) to mobilize the initiator
and potential supporters (Linder, 2010).
4Public opinion data tends to corroborate these differences. In a comparative study, Bowler and Donovan
(2004) found that Switzerland has the highest support for direct democracy among 16 established democra-
cies. 84 percent of Swiss citizens agreed, or even strongly agreed on the question “Thinking about politics in
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be asked whether direct democracy increases democratic satisfaction in political systems such
as those in the US states.
2.3 Direct and Representative Institutions and How They Affect Satisfac-
tion with Democracy
We are not the first to look at the intersection of representative and direct democracy with
a focus on how it affects citizens’ satisfaction. Bernauer and Vatter (2012) claim that direct
democracy (combined with large governments) is another consensual aspect that decreases
losers’ deprivation and limits winners’ satisfaction. For them, these two elements, consensual
decision-making (or power sharing) and direct democracy, are both part of horizontal power
sharing. We take a different point of view here. Based on their analysis of 24 countries,
they limit their study to the specific situation where direct democracy is embedded in the
context of consensual democracy. This is obviously the result of empirical limitations, namely
that Switzerland – being the only country with substantial direct democracy at the national
level – is an outlier on the cabinets-direct-democracy dimension. The authors acknowledge
that only in Switzerland one can observe a level of consensual direct democracy that is able
to equalize satisfaction with democracy between electoral winners and losers (ibid. 455).
Hence, empirically, this raises some doubts about whether this result is driven by the case of
Switzerland. At the theoretical level, accordingly, the study does not provide an argument
about how direct democracy could interact with a more majoritarian model of democracy.
Finally, the study by Radcliff and Shufeldt (2016) suggests that direct democracy may
affect winner-loser differences in majoritarian contexts. Following these authors, citizens in
the US states gain psychologically or emotionally from knowing that important matters will be
discussed and decided in an inclusive way rather than in a “confusing, uncertain, and potentially
corrupt ‘smoke filled rooms’ of the legislative process” (Radcliff and Shufeldt, 2016, p. 1419).
This argument implies that the benefits of direct democracy may be particularly important in
a majoritarian setting to also intrinsically include the electoral losers.
Switzerland, to what extent do you agree or disagree: referendums are a good way to decide important political
questions?” (Bowler and Donovan, 2004, 352). By contrast, only 64 percent of US citizens agreed or strongly
agreed when asked this question. According to Smith, Tolbert, and Keller (2010, 513), even fewer citizens
are in favor of a national referendum. See also Anderson and Goodyear-Grant (2010) for more insights on
preferences towards direct democratic institutions.
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2.4 Hypotheses
Building on these two strands of literature, we formulate several expectations with respect
to how direct democracy affects individual democratic satisfaction in different representative
contexts.
First, we follow previous research in assuming that direct democracy has the potential to
generally increase satisfaction with democracy. Given that previous research has had substan-
tial empirical limits related to the lack of variance either with respect to different representative
contexts or direct democracy, we think that the inconclusive findings could be the result of
these empirical limitations, while we consider the proposed theoretical mechanisms as valid
and reasonable. Our first expectation, therefore, suggests that more extensive direct democracy
is generally related to higher levels of democratic satisfaction.
Nevertheless, we also agree on the fact that when studying the effects of direct democracy,
we should take into account these institutions’ embeddings in various representative contexts
(Hug, 2009) and consider that the impact of direct democracy may be contingent on the
representative context. Therefore, we test a second hypothesis: The relationship between
direct democracy and satisfaction with democracy varies between representative contexts.
In addition, previous research on the winner-loser gap provides different arguments accord-
ing to which direct democracy may decrease democratic satisfaction between winners and losers
of the electoral system. While Bernauer and Vatter (2012) emphasize the equalizing effect of
consensual direct democracy (i.e., direct democracy embedded in a consensual representative
setting), which is obviously predominant in Switzerland, the study by Radcliff and Shufeldt
(2016) implies that direct democracy may particularly accommodate losers in majoritarian
systems because direct democracy prevents winners to take absolutely all. Both studies do
not investigate the independent effect of direct democracy and are theoretically and empiri-
cally limited to their specific country contexts. However, based on these studies and linking
them to previous research on direct democracy and democratic satisfaction, we assume that
the equalizing effect of direct democracy could be rather generic and affect winner-loser dif-
ferences in democratic systems across different representative contexts. The main mechanisms
that we assume to be at play are related to the procedural and substantial direct democracy
effects reported in previous research (Frey and Stutzer, 2000; Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter,
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2012): On the one hand, the procedural effect of direct democracy can be expected to be
more important for electoral losers than for winners. However, the latter have been shown
to profit from “outcome favorability” (Marien and Kern, 2018) in different electoral systems,
i.e., to exhibit higher levels of satisfaction with democracy, easy access to direct democratic
instruments may signal to the former that the democratic process is still open also for elec-
toral losers. This should decrease the differences in democratic satisfaction between electoral
winners and users. Moreover, at the level of political outcomes, a strong reliance on direct
democracy has been shown to have a “democratic effect” especially in situations of conflict
between the political elite and the citizens (Leemann and Wasserfallen, 2016). Thus, in the
context of a strong direct democracy, political outcomes are likely to move somewhat away
from the winning majority and tend to better include the minority, i.e., the electoral losers.
Summarizing this discussion, both mechanisms can be expected to bring electoral winners and
losers closer together with respect to their democratic satisfaction compared with a context
where citizens’ direct involvement does not exist or is more limited: Direct democracy reduces
the gap in satisfaction with democracy between electoral winners and losers.
3 Research Design
In this section, we describe our methodological approach to test our theoretical expectations,
data, and operationalizations. Subsection 3.2, specifically discusses and presents our compar-
ative measure of sub-national direct democracy.
3.1 Data and operationalization
For our analyses, we use four surveys conducted in Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and
the US (ANES, 2019; AUTNES et al., 2016; GLES, 2018; Selects, 2016). Each of these surveys
asks respondents how satisfied they are with democracy and provides four answer categories
(from “very satisfied” to “not satisfied at all”).5 This forms the outcome variable in all analyses
5The precise formulations are the following: Austria: “How satisfied or dissatisfied are you, on the whole,
with how democracy works in Austria? Very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied?”
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presented here.6
We acknowledge that conceptually, our measure of democratic satisfaction has its weak-
nesses since it captures national satisfaction, while our hypotheses focus at the sub-national
level. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical alternative to this
approach as no data are available that contain information on sub-national democratic sat-
isfaction and are comparable across the sub-national units of several countries. However, in
Appendix A2, we present additional analyses to support our claim that our measure of national
democratic satisfaction is a useful indicator to analyze variance in sub-national satisfaction
with democracy. For this purpose, we use the few data sets that do contain both national and
sub-national democratic satisfaction to compare how individuals across different sub-national
units and countries evaluate these two phenomena.7 These analyses demonstrate that em-
pirically, individual evaluations of national and sub-national satisfaction with democracy are
highly correlated at the individual level, whereas sub-national satisfaction is evaluated slightly
better across all sub-national units and the correlations are similar across sub-national units.
Moreover, and important for our analyses, when using this data to replicate the individual-
level models presented in this article, the winner-loser gap can be observed independent of
whether national or sub-national satisfaction with democracy is the dependent variable. To
summarize, national democratic satisfaction seems to be a valid indicator for and and captures
the relevant variation in sub-national satisfaction with democracy. This also means that the
weaknesses related to our main dependent variable are mostly conceptual in nature, while
there is no reason to believe that they should affect our empirical conclusions. If at all, our
approach may rather underestimate the role of sub-national direct democracy.
On the individual level, our central explanatory variable is whether an individual is an
(Translation); Germany: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, satisfied, fairly satisfied or not at all satisfied
with the way democracy works in Germany?”(Translation); Switzerland: “Are you satisfied with the way
democracy, on the whole, works in Switzerland?” (Translation) with response categories “very satisfied”, “fairly
satisfied”, “not very satisfied”, “not at all satisfied”; United States: “On the whole, are you [very satisfied, fairly
satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied] with the way democracy works in the United States?”
6This survey question is not uncontested. As Canache, Mondak, and Seligson (2001), for example, demon-
strate, the indicator captures multiple dimensions of political support, including system support, support for
authorities, as well as support for democracy. However, in our context, this quite well corresponds to a per-
spective according to which direct democracy is more than a pure systemic feature and also involves specific
political processes and cultures (Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter, 2012).
7More precisely, we use the Making Electoral Democracy Work dataset (Stephenson et al., 2017), which
contains national and sub-national democratic satisfaction for two German and two Swiss sub-national units,
as well as GLES data on sub-national elections in six German sub-national units in the years 2016 and 2017.
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electoral winner or loser. To create this variable, we first collected data on the composition
of the sub-national government of the 101 units in 2016. Considering that governments dif-
fer with respect to their form and electoral procedures, this indicator may thus capture the
incumbent’s party affiliation in presidential systems such as those in the US states, a single-
party government such as that in the German Bundesland Bayern, or several political parties
forming a coalition government such as in most German Bundesländer and particularly in all
Austrian and Swiss sub-national governments. We then generate a binary variable indicating
whether a respondent supports a political party in the government (winner) or not (loser).8
Moreover, we integrate indicators for gender and age, seven indicators for different educa-
tion categories, and six employment categories. We have a fairly large data set; hence, we add
all these individual factors as binary indicators.
On the context level, our central explanatory variable is the sub-national Direct Democracy
Index, which measures to what extent a citizenry can rely on direct democratic procedures (We
explain this indicator in more detail in Section 3.2). A second factor that differs systematically
across sub-national units is the size of the government majority. This variable allows us
to account for varying degrees of majoritarian and consensual democracies (Anderson and
Guillory, 1997; Lijphart, 1999). To measure this, we use the sum of the vote shares of all
parties that are in the government. The size of the governing coalition can affect satisfaction
by affecting the perceived legitimacy of decisions (e.g., André and Depauw, 2017; Arnesen
et al., 2019). Later on, we also rely on an alternative measure that operationalizes horizontal
power sharing (Bernauer and Vatter, 2019). We present an overview of all variables in the
appendix (see Appendix A1).
Across various model specifications, we estimate hierarchical ordered logit models where
individuals i are nested in a sub-national unit j. The underlying latent variable y∗ij cannot be
observed but the response yij to the satisfaction question is known:
8In some surveys, we have to use vote choice as an indicator. Since these are national election surveys,
it is possible that the vote for national legislative office does not align with sub-national partisan preference.
Luckily, for Germany, we have a direct question of party preferences regardless of elections. We also show
that these results hold, when we exclude sub-national units where we rely on a vote intention survey question,
that have single member districts, and multi-party systems (where strategic voting may occur). Some Swiss
cantons fulfill all three criteria, and we exclude them to ensure that this measurement issue is not hampering





1 (not at all satisfied) if −∞ < y∗ij < τ1
2 (not very satisfied) if τ1 < y
∗
ij < τ2
3 (fairly satisfied) if τ2 < y
∗
ij < τ3
4 (very satisfied) if τ3 < y
∗
ij <∞
We have a number of different model specifications. The following equation defines the model
we present as Model 1 in Table 2. Individual-level variables are grouped into a matrix Xij ,
and the direct democracy index of unit j is captured in DDj :
y∗ij = β0j +Xijβ + βDD ×DDj + εij





In most models, we also include a fixed-effects specification to account for country differences;
this is indicated in each table. All models are estimated in R, relying on the ordinal package
(Christensen, 2018). We start out with general models and then explore potential heteroge-
neous effects.
3.2 A Comparative Measure of Sub-national Direct Democracy
In the previous sections, we have pointed out the limits of cross-national analyses given the
lack of variance with regards to direct democracy. The alternative strategy, country-specific
sub-national analyses, is also problematic: When analyzing all Swiss cantons or all US states,
there is little variance with regards to representative democracy. All Swiss cantons more or less
follow the ideal of a consensual democracy with proportional electoral systems, oversized ex-
ecutives, etc. (Vatter, 2002). All American states have majoritarian political systems. Hence,
the most promising way to investigate the interaction between direct democracy and repre-
sentative democracy is to analyze sub-national entities (with and without direct democracy)
across different country contexts. This enables us to analyze variance both regarding direct
democracy and representative democracy.
However, measuring direct democracy (at the sub-national level) is not self-evident (see,
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e.g., Matsusaka, 2000; Stutzer, 1999; Leemann, 2019). Very different measurement approaches
have been used in the US and the European (mostly Swiss) context, for example. To date,
there are no comparable comparative data or indicator for sub-national democracy. To that
end, we propose a measure of direct democratic institutions for sub-national units that allows
to measure the extent of these institutions across various country contexts. This index builds
directly on Altman (2017) and his Direct Democracy Practice Potential, but has been adapted
for our purposes. While the technical discussion on the index is relegated to the appendix (see
subsection A3.4), in this section, we describe the concept and how it departs from existing
conceptions. We then discuss how the index is constructed. In the final step, we show how
sub-national entities in the US, Switzerland, Germany, and Austria compare to each other on
terms of the extent of direct democracy they offer to the citizenry.
3.2.1 Direct Democracy - A Concept
Our concept of direct democracy is a set of institutions that allow citizens to challenge a
government’s decision. It is an institutionalized process by which citizens either collect (suf-
ficient) signatures and force a ballot vote thereby or the constitution demands a mandatory
ballot vote. The outcome of the vote has to be binding. We choose this narrow definition on
purpose because using a broader concept would run the risk of conflating fundamentally differ-
ent aspects. We want to capture the non-representative avenue by which citizens can change
or affect policy decisions (see, e.g., Cheneval and el-Wakil, 2018). This deviates, e.g., from
the definition of direct democracy by Altman (2011), which would also cover plebiscites and,
more generally, ballot votes initiated by the government. Our concept is in fact closer to what
Altman labels bottom-up direct democracy, with the exception that we include mandatory
referendums.
The latter is important to account for the indirect way through which direct democratic
institutions can affect policy outcomes. Policymakers knowing or expecting a referendum vote
down the road will anticipate this and not implement their preferred policy but rather the
best policy that will likely survive the vote (e.g., Neidhart, 1970; Gerber, 1996; Matsusaka and
McCarty, 2001; Hug, 2004; Leemann and Wasserfallen, 2016).9 The empirical evidence in the
9See also Rappard (1912) for an early argument about anticipation effects. It is noteworthy that his argument
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US is mixed. On the one hand, Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin (1996) did not find empirical
support for such a mechanism. On the other hand, Gerber (1996) presents results that are fully
consistent with such a mechanism. In Switzerland, we find a clearer picture. There is empirical
support for the anticipation claim in Swiss cantons (Leemann and Wasserfallen, 2016). This is
part of the core characteristic of our concept of direct democracy.10 It is also in line with many
formal theoretical treatments of the subject where the policy-setter (legislature or government)
does not implement its ideal point but rather the best policy for itself such that it just fails to
provoke a referendum (e.g., Romer and Rosenthal, 1978; Hug, 2004; Matsusaka and McCarty,
2001; Leemann and Wasserfallen, 2016). The essence is that representative systems produce
different outcomes when every governmental decision can potentially be challenged at the
ballot box.
In consequence, this understanding also (mostly) excludes the increasing number of refer-
endums on EU-related matters in EU-states. These referendums, as we argue here, are in most
cases not actually elements of the institutionalized decision-making process and, therefore, in
many respects follow a different logic than direct democracy, as conceptualized in this paper
(Heidbreder et al., 2019).
Finally, there is a rare institution that straddles the line between direct and representative
democracy: the recall (Kölz, 1996, p. 105). The recall allows citizens to collect signatures
to unseat an elected official. While it is somewhere between the representative and direct
part, we eventually exclude it from the final measure as it also empirically appears to be an
independent dimension unrelated to the other elements of direct democracy (see Figure A7
and subsection A3.4 in the appendix for more details).
3.2.2 Measuring Sub-National Direct Democracy
The sub-national direct democracy index (snDDI) is based on a number of different institutions
and indicators. For each of the three institutions – the initiative, optional, and mandatory
is based on the initiative and who is being allowed to participate in the law-making process (p. 138-139).
10The reason why this is relevant lies in its efficiency. Although all people do not vote on ev-
ery matter, the constant threat of the ballot box can still exert an influence without one single voter
having to collect signatures or to actually vote. This might be the truly fascinating part. See this
blog post for a more detailed version of the argument, http://www.democraticaudit.com/2016/06/22/
is-direct-democracy-effective-yes-if-it-is-citizens-who-start-the-process/.
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referendum – we want to measure how easily they can be used by citizens to force the legislative
or executive to change policy and whether they are actually used.
To measure the strength of each component, we follow – with some exceptions (see later)
– the indicators of the cross-national direct democracy measure proposed by Altman (2017).
We rely on the number of signatures that have to be collected (signature), the time given to
collect the required signatures (time), whether there is any participatory requirement to vali-
date the vote outcome (quorum)11, whether a ballot vote is required to pass any extra-majority
to be considered successful (extramaj), and a variable that indicates whether this institution
was used recently (threat); the last one allows to distinguish cases where there is the de jure
possibility, but it is not used de facto.
3.2.3 Operationalization
For most components, we follow closely the operationalization of Altman (2015) and apply it to
sub-national units. The operationalization of time to collect signatures (t measured in years) is
√
t, whereas all durations longer than one year are capped at one. If one has 9 months to gather




). This is directly taken from Altman (2017). The
aspect of a potential quorum (labeled q) is based on whether there is a minimal participation
requirement or a combination of participation and support. This is based on the status quo
surface (Altman, 2011) and takes the value 0.5 if there are no restrictions. The indicator
extra-majoritarian factor (em) accommodates double-majority requirements. An example of
such a double-majority is found in national Swiss initiatives, where not only a majority of the
voters need to approve but also a majority of the voters in a majority of the cantons. It is
measured as em = 0.5 +
1−D
2
, whereas D measures the share of districts that have to approve.
The threat indicator measures whether the institution also exist de facto, and any use in the
last five years leads to its maximum value. After that, the score continuously declines by 0.06
per year – if the last use of an institution is 22 or more years ago, the value is 0.
There is one clear deviation from Altman’s approach, and it is found when we operationalize
11For national referendums in Italy, e.g., there is a quorum of 50%, and one frequent strategy (of the
group supporting the bill that would be toppled by the referendum ballot) is to not participate to reduce the
participation sufficiently such that the outcome is not valid (Uleri, 2002).
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the signature threshold. This component should be high when very few signatures are needed
and low when many signatures are needed. We measure how low the signature threshold is
and rely on a quickly declining function in the number of required signatures. We measure
signature (s∗) as s = 0.01s%
2
+0.01
. This function is continuous in s% (required share of citizens
that have to sign) but much more sensitive than the proposed (1 − s%) by Altman.12 In
the appendix, we visualize these differences (see Figure A6). In doing so, our measure is
more sensitive to signature thresholds. This is important as the signature threshold translates
directly into how easy or how difficult it is to employ these institutions (see, e.g, Hug, 2004).
We recapitulate the different elements that go into the final measure in Table 1. The
table also shows how each of the three dimensions [optional referendum (OR), Mandatory
referendum (MR), and initiative (PI)] is measured. The score is the product of Openness,
Effectiveness, and Threat, and lies in the interval [0,2]. In the final step, we aggregate
over these three scores by taking the average value across all three institutions to generate an
overall measure of snDDI.
Table 1: Details of the snDDI
Institution Openness Effectiveness Threat
Optional referendum (OR) IOR ⋅ s
∗
OR ⋅ tOR eM,OR IT,OR
Mandatory referendum (MR) IMR eM,MR
Initiative (PI) IPI ⋅ s
∗
PI ⋅ tPI eM,PI IT,PI




t⋅: time to collect signatures, em,⋅: extra-majoritarian factor.
The next section is a brief descriptive account of the measures in the US, Germany, Switzer-
land, and Austria.
3.2.4 Comparing Direct Democracy in Sub-National Units
Figure 1 shows the values of the indicator in the sub-national units of the US, Germany,
Austria, and Switzerland. It is important to note that the index documents considerable
variance in the degree of direct democracy not only between but also within countries.
12One difficulty in collecting data is that the signature threshold is defined in different ways. In Swiss cantons
and German Länder, it is usually formulated as the share of all voting-eligible citizens. In the US, it is usually
formulated as the share of people participating in the last gubernatorial election. We translate the US rules,
by taking vote turn-out into account, into a comparable measure.
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Figure 1: Comparison of snDDI
In Austria, most citizens do not have access to direct democracy, with the exception of
those living in Vorarlberg and Salzburg. In Germany, this picture changes, and most Länder
know direct democratic instruments, although at a moderate level. The US is an interesting
case. About half of the states have DDIs, but even the other states (with the exception of
Delaware) score a non-zero score since they require a mandatory referendum for changes in
the state constitution. Finally, Swiss cantons have extensive DDIs, comparable to the upper
half of the states in the US.
Validation of this measure is not straight forward. However, for the Swiss cantons, there
exists a continuous measure and one can compare the two to see if there is a strong com-
monality. In the appendix, we provide such a comparison demonstrating that the correlations
between the two measures are very high (see subsection A3.3). This also suggests that our
measure is able to capture relevant variance within the group of entities with a high degree of
direct democracy. We also provide a full table with individual values of the sub-national units
on the index (see subsection A3.2).
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4 Empirical Tests: Are Direct Democratic Rights Related to
Higher Satisfaction with Democracy?
4.1 Satisfaction with Democracy in General
In a first empirical test, we explore whether respondents living in sub-national units with
more extensive direct democratic rights are in general more satisfied with democracy than
respondents living in sub-national units with less extensive direct democratic rights.
Table 2: Ordered Logit Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Voted for Party Government 0.42∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Direct Democracy 0.34∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ −0.09 −0.56
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.61)
Size of Majority 1.08∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.01
(0.28) (0.30) (0.32)
DD X Indicator AT 0.40
(0.70)
DD X Indicator GE 0.63
(0.65)
DD X Indicator US 0.45
(0.62)
Individual-Level Variables ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓






















`` −11348.46 −11341.11 −11314.93 −11314.35
NIndividuals 11318 11318 11318 11318
NGroups 101 101 101 101
 ̂
2
Groups 0.13 0.11 0.05 0.05
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, all models include a gender indicator, age and age2,
indicators for seven education categories, whether somebody participated in the last
elections, and six employment categories.
Table 2 presents four different models. Across all four models, we find that the threshold
parameters τ are well estimated and clearly separated. This indicates that the models are
doing a good job in separating the response categories.
Model 1 contains the winner-loser variable, i.e., whether or not a respondent voted for a
party in the government and the snDDI, as well as all other individual-level variables (included
but estimates not shown). Model 2 adds a context-variable accounting for the size of the
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majority. In Model 3, we add country fixed effects. Finally, in Model 4, we interact country
indicators with the snDDI to allow for country-specific effects.
Across all models, electoral winners display a significantly higher satisfaction with democ-
racy than electoral losers. Turning to direct democracy, the picture is less clear. In Model
1, there is a positive estimate, and this relationship remains positive and significant when we
take into account the size of the majority. But once we allow for unobserved country-level
factors – which constrains β̂DD’s identification to within country variation – there is no indica-
tion anymore that there is a significant relationship between direct democracy and individual
satisfaction with democracy.
Finally, in Model 4, we allow a country-specific relationship between individual satisfac-
tion and sub-national levels of direct democracy. Baseline for the direct democratic effect is
Switzerland, and the three interactions show the deviation thereof. We find that a significant
parameter estimate is not present in any of the countries.13
These first tests fail to provide systematic empirical evidence in favor of the satisfaction hy-
pothesis (see Model 3). Moreover, the estimates do not suggest that the relationship between
direct democracy and satisfaction with democracy systematically varies between different rep-
resentative contexts (see Model 4). The results are consistent, i.e., there is no significant
coefficient for the snDDI in any model. We also run the same models and replace the snDDI
with a a measure of direct democracy usage rather than institutional provisions. The results
presented in the appendix, see Table A12, are line with the results presented here.
4.1.1 Winners and Losers When There is Some Direct Democracy
In the next step, we test whether electoral winners’ and losers’ satisfaction with democracy is
different when, in addition to the institution of representative government, (significant) direct
democratic institutions exist.
In most polities, electoral losers are less satisfied with democracy compared with electoral
winners (In Figure A3 in the appendix, we provide a visualization of the satisfaction gap per
sub-national unite). Three observations are noteworthy. First, the winner-loser gap varies
13The significance cannot be gleaned from this output as we are lacking the covariance part. The 95% CIs
are as follows; AT [−0.90,0.54], GE [−0.40,0.51], and US [−0.23,0.15]. In all countries, the confidence interval
contains zero.
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Table 3: Ordered Logit Models
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Share of Voters in Government −0.01 0.07
(0.30) (0.35)
Direct Democracy 0.06 0.06 0.05
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Voted for Party Government 0.76∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.23)
DD X Voted for Gov −0.31∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Voted for Gov X Size of Majority −0.17
(0.35)
Individual-Level Variables ✓ ✓ ✓



















`` −11286.78 −11286.78 −11286.67
NIndividuals 11318 11318 11318
NGroups 101 101 101
 ̂
2





∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, all models include a gender indicator, age and age2,
indicators for seven education categories, whether somebody participated in last elections,
and six employment categories.
considerably between the 101 units, both between and within countries. Second, the variance
in the winner-loser gap is very pronounced for the US, while it is very limited for Switzerland.
Third, the average gap is the largest in Austria and the US. On an individual level, the
difference in satisfaction between electoral winners and losers is similar between respondents
that participated in elections and those that abstained.
By including an interaction term between direct democracy and the winner-loser variable
into the models, we allow the winner-loser gap to vary depending on the extent of direct
democracy provided by the sub-national system. Table 3 presents three different models that
all support the argument that direct democracy can help to close the gap between winners
and losers in the representative system.
Across all models in Table 3, we find a consistent negative and statistically significant
interaction effect between the winner-loser gap and the extent of direct democracy afforded to
citizens. Model 5 is the most parsimonious model and only includes whether a respondent is an
electoral winner, the extent of direct democracy in that sub-national unit, and the interaction
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of both factors. In Model 6, we further include our proxy for the type of representative system.
Including this variable does not affect the results. In Model 7, we also include an interaction
with the size of the majority in the government, but this interaction term is not statistically
significant. Conversely, the significant interaction coefficient describing direct democracy’s
potential to close the gap between electoral winners and losers persists even after taking into
account the extent of horizontal power sharing.
We also provide a number of robustness tests. First, we rely on a measure from Bernauer
and Vatter (2019) on horizontal power sharing and find similar results (see Table A14). Second,
and as mentioned earlier, we replicate the results by using direct democracy usage rather
than the institutional provisions. Table A13 in the appendix shows almost identical results.
Third, following the suggestions of an anonymous reviewer, we also estimate one set of models,
where we simply count how many direct democratic institutions are present in a sub-national
unit, while not taking into account the ease by which they can be used. These results are
presented in Table A15. Fourth, an additional robustness test does not use the combined
index value but only the sub-components for each institution. These results are presented
in Table A16. All of these additional models support the main findings of this paper. The
significant negative interaction effect between election winner and direct democracy is present
in all these alternative models.
To illustrate the model interaction, we resort to predicted probabilities across the full range
of potential values for direct democracy. The simulated outcomes are shown in Figure 2. We
rely on a pseudo-Bayesian approach and generate 1,000 draws from a multivariate normal dis-
tribution where the central moment is the estimated coefficient vector and the second moment
is the variance-covariance matrix. We use these to provide first and second moments of the
predicted outcomes. This allows us to show the overall relationship between satisfaction and
direct democracy for electoral winners and electoral losers. We also add an illustration of the
net difference between the two in the lower panel, informing about the substantial relevance
of the interaction.
The figure demonstrates that the satisfaction gap between electoral winners and electoral
losers closes the higher the level of direct democracy is.14 As the lower panel in Figure 2
14We refrain from trying to adjudicate whether the narrowing is affected more by diminished satisfaction
of winners or by increased satisfaction of losers. Part of the problem is that we are looking at model-based
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Figure 2: Satisfaction with Democracy at Varying Levels of Direct Democracy for Winners
and Losers
Note: Upper panel shows predicted probabilities to be satisfied with democracy. Lower panel shows difference in
satisfaction with democracy for electoral winners and losers. All results are based on simulated predicted probabilities
from posterior vector.
illustrates, the difference in democratic satisfaction between electoral winners and losers is
statistically significant in sub-national units with no or low levels of direct democracy. The
difference is similar to that found between respondents participating in the election and re-
spondents not participating in the election.15 However, with increasing sub-national direct
democracy, the winner-loser gap diminishes and loses statistical significance. When the snDDI
predictions, and this could be the consequence of assumed linearity on the latent dimension. Note, that we
find in the raw data a narrowing of the gap while satisfaction increases for both, electoral winners, and losers
(see Figure A8).
15See Kostelka and Blais (2018) for a more in-depth treatment of participation and satisfaction with democ-
racy.
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is greater than 1, which is the case in all Swiss cantons and 15 US states, there is no significant
difference between winners and losers. Finally, such a narrowing of the gap can also be found
in the raw data (see the appendix, Figure A8).
Overall, these results clearly suggest that direct democracy closes the gap between winners
and losers in an electoral system. This mechanism is not bound to one particular represen-
tative system, as suggested by previous literature (Bernauer and Vatter, 2012; Radcliff and
Shufeldt, 2016) but seems to be relevant across the majoritarian and consensual sub-national
democracies of Switzerland, the US, Germany, and Austria. In fact, the interaction effect
is stable even if an additional interaction between direct democracy and the share of voters
represented in government is added as a proxy for the distinction between consensual and ma-
joritarian democracies. Moreover, the latter is not significant, thus corroborating our previous
conclusion that the relationship between direct democracy and democratic satisfaction does
not systematically vary between different representative systems.
5 Conclusion
This paper starts from the observation that the quantitative literature on direct democracy is
stuck within countries. As a consequence, many expectations about what direct democracy
can and cannot do are empirically built on weak ground. On the one hand, results obtained in
one specific context tend to be generalized despite the fact that direct democratic institutions
may generate varying mechanisms and outcomes in different representative contexts (Heid-
breder et al., 2019; Hug, 2009). On the other hand, results are often inconsistent, possibly due
to the fact that they have been obtained in different contexts. To break out of these confine-
ments, we propose a comparative sub-national perspective across national borders to analyze
whether direct democratic institutions are systematically associated with citizens’ satisfaction
with democracy (Frey and Stutzer, 2000, 2010). For this reason, we develop an index that
allows to measure how strong the direct democratic rights in sub-national units are in the US,
Switzerland, Germany, and Austria. We present – to the best of our knowledge – the most
encompassing empirical test of the satisfaction hypothesis including 101 sub-national units
from four countries in which direct democracy – at least de jure – is a relevant element in the
24
sub-national policy-making process.
The first main conclusion of this analysis is that there is no general robust relationship
between the extent to which direct democracy exists in an entity and the level of citizens’
satisfaction with how democracy works. Even though we document substantial differences in
both the degree of direct democracy and democratic satisfaction within and between countries,
there is no consistent association between the two phenomenons once we control for country-
specific effects. Hence, our analysis, which compared with previous research uses a different
measure of direct democracy and a cross-country comparative design, does not lend empirical
support to the prominent satisfaction thesis (Frey and Stutzer, 2000; Stutzer and Frey, 2003).
The second important finding is that there is a robust interaction between satisfaction with
democracy and the presence of direct democratic institutions. Electoral winners and electoral
losers differ in their satisfaction. This satisfaction gap is large when there is no or little di-
rect democracy, while it diminishes and finally disappears as the extent of direct democracy
increases. In contrast to previous research, we find this equalizing mechanism to work across
different representative systems, i.e., it is not limited to the specific combination of consen-
sual and direct democracy (Bernauer and Vatter, 2012) or direct democracy in majoritarian
democracies (Radcliff and Shufeldt, 2016). While part of the motivation was to illustrate
how the effects of direct democracy can vary across representative systems, the relationship
between winner-loser gap, direct democracy, and satisfaction does not vary across the four
systems analyzed here. In the model-based predictions, satisfaction appears to decline more
for the electoral winners than it increases for the electoral losers. In the raw data, satisfaction
is higher for both groups, and the gap narrows where extensive direct democracy exists. It re-
mains an open question for future research to determine the relative contributions (of winners
and losers) to the narrowing of the gap.
The findings presented in this study have several implications. Theoretically and empiri-
cally, we add to the chorus of those arguing that direct democracy does not make democracy
better as such and in an automatic way (see, e.g., Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2010; Lee-
mann, 2015). However, our cross-country sub-national approach consistently shows that direct
democracy is not per se related to more democratic satisfaction; our results imply that direct
democracy moderates the outcomes of the representative context in which these instruments
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are embedded. In particular, we document a varying association between direct democracy
and satisfaction with democracy for electoral winners and losers. In this vein, however, our
findings also come with a grain of salt. There is no evidence that strong reliance on direct
democratic instruments make the losers more satisfied, i.e., catching up with the winners.
We need to acknowledge that our design – besides the merits – comes at the cost of some
disadvantages as well. The analyses are based on observational, cross-sectional data, which –
like in almost all previous research on these matters – do not allow us to identify causal effects.
Of course, this limitation is not only a question of data availability but also of the fact that
direct-democratic institutions are rather stable over time. Moreover, the disadvantages of this
study are also related to the fact that we only have four observations on the country-level,
which limits our ability to disentangle the effects of sub-national direct democracy and the
national representative system. A path for future research could be to apply this indicator to
even more countries where direct democratic instruments exist at the sub-national level, as well
as to other research questions to further improve our understanding of how direct democracy
“works” in different representative contexts.
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